Introduction
In this intriguing book, Steven G. Crowell takes on the challenge of situating phenomenology in contemporary philosophy. To this end, he engages with several traditions outside of, and interpretative strands within, phenomenology. The real topic of the book is seemingly Heidegger; yet it is a Heidegger who can only be understood in the rich tradition that made his originality possible, namely, Husserl and, in critical rejection, the dominant school in Germany at the time, Neo-Kantianism. In this sense, it is a book Husserl aficionados should consider as well. Crowell presents the reader with a collection of thirteen substantial articles, twelve of which have been published previously, ranging over more than a decade in which the author has worked extensively through matters pertaining to phenomenology. The chapters have been arranged into two sections: Part 1, entitled "Reconfiguring Transcendental Logic" (chapters 1-5),and Part 2, "Phenomenology and the Very Idea of Philosophy" (chapters 6-13).These section titles stand for several overarching questions that Crowell addresses that can be paraphrased as follows: 'What constitutes phenomenology as phenomenology, i.e., as a methodology?', 'What are its distinguishing traits?', and 'Where can it contribute to discussions within current debates in the philosophical world at large, for instance in the philosophy of mind?' The debate over phenomenology as transcendental philosophy cuts right to the core of the issue, tackling the very question regarding the preconditions of phenomenology itself as a reflective undertaking that is auto-reflexive, as a philosophical endeavor with the character of being "necessarily related back to itself." 1 Without such a (self-)reflection on the very possibility of its own activity, phenomenology cannot claim to be a critical enterprise. If it is not critical, however (Crowell argues), it can only be pre-transcendental, naïve, realistic or (at best) mystical or "Gnostic" (cf. the introduction, 3-19).
2 Crowell accepts none of these options but explores, rather, what constitutes phenomenology as a transcendental enterprise. Crowell's reflections
Luft 2
center on the question concerning the condition of possibility of transcendental philosophy itself, to recall a well-known book title. 3 Although the chapters display some unavoidable overlap due to their previous publication, this is not perceived as redundant. Instead, there is a guiding thread visible throughout the book, and the reader is led along it nicely by following a convincing systematic order. It is as if the author has had in mind an overarching idea all along as he wrote the chapters, and putting these remotely published articles together has turned out to be a felicitous decision. This book is an important contribution to contemporary phenomenology, especially to relationship. Yet, this book is more about Heidegger than Husserl(or, for that matter, anybody else from the Phenomenological Movement).It is a Heidegger, however, who is essentially seen through an Husserlian prism; who cannot be understood on his own but stands on the shoulders of giants, the largest being Husserl. If the reader will finish this book convinced of Crowell's interpretation, she will have to admit to herself that it is impossible to remain a "Husserlian" in the way some do, i.e., as opposed to the "Heideggerians." 4 This is, in itself, a merit. 5 
Many of
Crowell's issues are merely hinted at -especially in the large apparatus of footnotes, where most of the revisions and additions have been made-due to overarching interests in the story he is telling. This is certainly also due to pragmatic constraints -the book, as it stands, is a tome of over 300 pages. The abbreviated comments about phenomenology's contribution to contemporary philosophy of mind (McDowell) seem especially worthy of future development.
In the following, I will limit myself to discussing a number of(systematic and historical)
issues that seem crucial to Crowell's overall standpoint. Any criticisms voiced here should be seen as questions or markers on the margins where I would be interested in hearing Crowell's response. Husserl, Heidegger, and the Space of Meaning is sure to spark further discussions within phenomenology and in phenomenology's conversations with other contemporary philosophical currents. It is to be hoped that these essays will not remain Crowell's last word on these issues.
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Phenomenology as a Transcendental Theory of Meaning
Crowell's overall claim is that phenomenology must come forth as a transcendental enterprise, and as such, that it is a transcendental theory of meaning (cf. especially chapters 3, 5, 9 and 10 et passim). Furthermore, Crowell contends, this theory has been realized in part by
Husserl but has been furthered in vital respects by Heidegger and must be further developed in the light of the unfinished nature of Heidegger's own project. 6 In so doing, however, Heidegger has in principle remained within the "space of meaning" that Husserl opened up. This presents both a systematic and an exegetical claim that is by no means a matter of course for many phenomenologists; namely systematically (a) that phenomenology needs to perform the transcendental turn in order to truly come into its own. That is, phenomenology is not merely concerned with a realistic, empirical description of phenomena that somehow are "given"
without questioning the fact that and the way in which they are given. Indeed, phenomenology
should clarify the conditions of possibility that make this givenness possible. Anything else would be mere "picture book phenomenology." These conditions of possibility are thus conditions of meaning, i.e., of how it is possible that we as conscious beings can make sense of that which is given (be it as meaning-intending or understanding agents). In thematizing this "space of meaning," phenomenology is eo ipso engaged in the project of transcendental philosophy. "To the things themselves" can only mean 'to the things as they are given as themselves, i.e., in the manner of meaning.'
Furthermore, concerning his exegetical method (b) Crowell claims that the first steps of this transcendental enterprise have been made by Husserl with the decisive achievement of the transcendental reduction. Husserl has remained, however, too caught up within a certain "Cartesianism" or "theoreticism" (or "mentalism") that renders his own achievements incomplete (69 ff.). He has, in other words, methodologically fallen short of his own accomplishments in the actual descriptive work he carried out, especially in his analyses of the lived-body and intersubjectivity. It was Heidegger who has exploited, in his own novel terminology, these phenomenological visions in the framework of his fundamental ontology of Dasein -although
Heidegger himself at many occasions blatantly shunned the supposedly inadequate attempts of his mentor, Crowell interprets this more as a typical pupil's reaction against a dominant mentor.
Heidegger was not able to see, or deliberately overlooked, what he owed to Husserl.
Conversely, something similar can be said for Husserl as well, who surmised that Heidegger's philosophy was a complete misunderstanding of his own intentions. To Crowell, phenomenology "as it ought to be" can56only be achieved in realizing that it has to be construed as
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transcendental philosophy and as it was conceived in the horizon opened up by Husserl and further fleshed out by Heidegger. This is, roughly, Crowell's overall thesis.
In the following, I shall discuss the ramifications of this claim and why it is contentious. It is important to realize that it is a contentious claim, precisely because it is presented in such a coherent manner. 7 The intention of Crowell's strategy, however, is clear: Counter to, e.g.,
Husserl's self-interpretation, phenomenology is by no means something "completely divorced"
or "unique" vis-a`-vis other philosophical tendencies of the tradition. Phenomenology will only assume its true potential when it realizes how it can contribute, to be sure in its own way, to modern philosophy. This requires toning down certain ambitions, on the one hand Husserl's radical claim that only transcendental phenomenology has ever entered the "promised land" of philosophy; on the other, Heidegger's belief that one should dispense with the entire tradition of Western philosophy and inaugurate a "new thinking." If there is a common denominator of what phenomenology means, Crowell seems to imply, it is rolling up one's sleeves and getting down to "the things themselves," thus remaining true to Husserl's idea of phenomenology as a genuine "working philosophy." gives itself is more than just a mythologeme but actually something that can be worked out in essential "regions" and in a rigorous scientific method. Givenness might be a "myth," i.e., at first a riddle, but as such a solvable one. 10 Moreover, that which gives itself is more than just brute, pure nature, but something that is "cultivated" through the human mind in its essentially meaning-bestowing activity: "Viewed here. If one, however, were to take the route of the critical reading, one would have to reject the thesis of the "unboundedness of the conceptual" and concede that phenomenology's domain lies with intuitions, and not concepts, thus adhering to the Kantian dichotomy that McDowell regards as a symptom (or an "exculpation"), rather than a solution to, a anxiety that has plagued philosophy since Kant. If the latter is the case, this would necessarily play into the well-known criticism that phenomenology is merely "pure description" and, hence, cannot make any critical, normative claims. Certainly this cannot be Crowell's intention. The question, it seems, amounts to the alternative "Kant and Husserl" or "Kant or Husserl" -concepts with intuitions, concepts or intuitions? Far from being in a position to answer this question, this reviewer is still not clear on phenomenology's actual relevance for transcendental philosophy. Many philosophers in the Kantian tradition are not convinced that they really need phenomenology, and although phenomenologists cannot accept being shunned in this way, Crowell's arguments still, unfortunately, leave me unconvinced as to how exactly they should help phenomenology's case. It seems that supplying this "functional concept of intuition to go along with the functional object concept" would be giving an answer to a question the very meaning of which has been shown to be altogether artificial.
McDowell and the Status of Transcendental Philosophy
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Lask and the Neo-Kantians vs. Phenomenology
In Logic" have the aim of "making logic philosophical again," i.e., to reconstruct phenomenology's quest to establish a transcendental logic as a genuine methodology for philosophy itself. In this sense, Husserl overcomes Lask's one-sided focus on logic by supplying a theory of transcendental subjectivity as the locus where "meaning" is actually experienced in evidence.
From this point of view, Husserl's phenomenological reduction is the necessary step that provides a space for subjectivity without (as this was the only alternative in Lask's eyes) lapsing into psychologism. Heidegger essentially went the same critical path as Husserl. The point of this reading is that Heidegger's focus on Dasein was equally motivated by, or not essentially distinct from, the transcendental reduction, although Heidegger would reject the term "reduction" and the ensuing transcendental vocabulary. This motivates Crowell's reading of Heidegger as essentially occupying the same philosophical space as Husserl-that of transcendental philosophy conceived as giving an account of how the space of meaning is experienced by an experiencing agent. In both cases-Lask's immanent problem of being unable to account for subjectivity as well as Husserl's parallel attempts at drafting a transcendental logic -Lask was Heidegger's catalyst for his own development in conjunction with, and in critique of, Husserl.
The merit of these passages dealing with Lask is to highlight a figure that has received too little attention in phenomenologicalresearch. According to Crowell, one can distinguish two main tendencies in Heidegger, one "mystical" (in the attempt to "eff the ineffable," 7), the other is "the Heidegger who is concerned with the reflexive issue of the possibility of philosophy itself, the Heidegger who constantly chastises other thinkers for not being rigorous enough, for succumbing to metaphysical prejudice and losing sight of the things themselves" (7) . Both readings are incompatible or at least conflicting, to Crowell. The "mystical" reading, especially van Buren's, is influenced mainly by Derrida and generally by postmodernism and Crowell rejects it rather quickly, 18 while Kisiel's work receives more attention. Although in the end this reading amounts to a similar "mysticism,"
it is more focused on Heidegger's concern with the "pretheoretical origins of meaning" (117) due to Heidegger's (in Kisiel's words) "BCD methodology"-biography, chronology, doxography (117). While Kisiel is applauded as the first one to really shed light on the textual situation of
Heidegger's early writings -something completely obfuscated in the philologically insufficient
Gesamtausgabe-his interpretation does not withstand close scrutiny. Kisiel focuses especially on the aspect of "life itself"-oftentimes emphasizing a favorite phrase of the early Heidegger which also Gadamer called attention to: "es weltet," "it worlds" -a pre-theoretical "structure" that escapes any direct reflection. All that philosophy can do is to "repeat" this pre-theoretical life and thereby perform a "belated" (nachtra¨glich) "illumination" (a term reminiscent of Jaspers' notion of philosophy as "Existenzerhellung").
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Against this interpretation Crowell argues that this "comportment" of repetition is itself nothing but reflection. This is in line with Crowell's overall reading of Heidegger according to Crowell seems to want to allow for. Hence, the opposition in interpretation perhaps ought not to
Luft 12
be as strong as Crowell himself makes it, i.e., between a "mystical" and a "rigorous scientific"
Heidegger. Maybe one can accommodate both tendencies if one does not make them out to be such strong oppositions, and this seems fairer to Heidegger's (partly also obscure) intentions in his early years. Perhaps one has to acknowledge that Heidegger was more "underway" and searching and, hence, vacillating between seemingly attractive tendencies, rather than to hold him to one position from the very start. The picture we would get, then, would be more of an ingenious and creative but searching philosopher who is still trying on different sets of clothes, 
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Crowell is the "clannish" behavior that has been displayed by representatives of both "camps" in the past. By the 1980s, great strides were made in both editions, thus giving the scholarly public a much more differentiated picture of both philosophical projects as they began to unfold, in the case of Husserl, essentially between 1900 and 1913 and then again as of the 20s, and, in the case of Heidegger, between 1919 and 1929. 23 Both Husserl's and Heidegger's developments can now be seen in a much clearer light. The possibility of insight into the respective "workshops," however, also facilitated a certain "specialization" on both sides of research that seemed to widen the gap between both. Hence the situation of "Husserlians" versus "Heideggerians." If, Crowell contends, phenomenology continues to quarrel over these petty issues, then it will not be able to make any serious progress in the "things themselves." It will remain caught up in futile infighting instead of thinking about what makes phenomenology a specific philosophy in its own right, so as to bring it back into the arena of contemporary philosophical discussions. Should this "conciliatory" move in the end be motivated by politics? It is to be sure; but it is more than just that. Crowell presents several arguments for the claim that opened up through the reduction, and yet see Heidegger's achievements, as radical as they maybe, as further refining and ameliorating the house that Husserl had built.
24
Criticisms of Husserl are thus internal suggestions for solving problems that Husserl had left unanswered. At the same time, this implies that Heidegger took over main tenets of his teacher, most importantly the phenomenological reduction. The form that the reduction takes in
Heidegger is a reflective move that Dasein, as a being essentially capable of philosophizing, performs in order to become clear about its own being. As an intrinsically understanding being, it reflects upon its own conditions of understanding by doing philosophy. This justifies, for
Crowell, the claim that Heidegger goes along with both the reduction and the transcendental turn. Now it seems that this interpretation would satisfy neither Husserlians nor Heideggerians.
Do not Husserlians insist that Heidegger rejects the epoché, i.e., that he, in the first place, is critical of the whole concept of the natural attitude as a necessary precondition for performing the epoché? Did not Heidegger insinuate that the natural attitude was a "theoretical construct"
produced by the "unparticipating observer," that he had mocked as a mere "gaping" at the world and hence not understanding it primarily as a practical world of meaning in which we are engaged "always already"? It would take too much space here to sort these issues out, and I think Crowell does an excellent job at doing so. Yet the bottom line is that Crowell's interest lies, again, not in doing justice to either interpretatively: "It thus becomes possible to project a significant rapprochement between Husserl and Heidegger, one that leaves neither totally unrevised" (181). The rapprochement consists65in utilizing both attempts as attempts of grasping the space of meaning as the theme of transcendental phenomenology. We can thus, with Husserl and Heidegger, retain a sense of the phenomenological reduction if we realize that it needn't be such a fundamental break with the natural attitude, but rather a reflective move that is already prefigured in Dasein's everyday life itself, a tendency that merely has to be grasped and made explicit. This step overcomes Husserl's unresolved issue of how it becomes possible to distance oneself from the natural attitude. That which would become thematized, hence, would not be a "transcendental field" opposed to that of the natural attitude, but merely a different ("strange") look at that which we "always already" do and are when we exist. Doing transcendental phenomenology would amount to thematizing how meaning unfolds in our everyday life, meaning that we usually take for granted, but which is something that in fact reveals itself to us in a certain genesis when we exist in the world with others and in a certain tradition. This would be, it seems, a way of reappropriating motives from Husserl's genetic phase. This means reinterpreting the reduction in a way that one meets both thinkers half-way:
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The reduction is a reflective move within life, not a radical break with the natural attitude, and it would remain a transcendental operation in that it, in this methodological move, reflects upon the conditions of possibility of this being-in-the-world as a world of meaning that we always already understand. In this way, Crowell nudges both thinkers in a direction that eliminates the explosive potential in both. Apart from methodological issues, Crowell delves into the actual subject matter of phenomenology. In short, is phenomenology a theory of cognition or an analysis of how Dasein exists in the world -i.e., is phenomenology epistemology or ontology?
Crowell discusses this issue in the context of Husserl's and Heidegger's (failed) collaboration on the Encyclopedia Britannica article. Heidegger here takes issue with the unclarified nature of the transcendental subject's being. This subject, to Husserl, is not in the world but constitutes it.
Hence, it cannot exist like beings in the world but yet must "be" something. Husserl's "answer"
to this question is, indeed, not really an answer a tall; namely he retorts with the infamous problem of the "paradox of subjectivity" as being at the same time an object in the world and a subject for the world. To be fair to Husserl, one should insist that it is a paradox only as long as one has not realized the radical change of attitude that the reduction brings about. In other words, the paradox arises when one realizes that one can view the same "entity" from both the natural and the philosophical perspective, and through this realization the paradox dissolves.
This, however, does not really further the issue. Heidegger's pressing Husserl on the question of the "mode of being of the transcendental ego" must be, so Crowell contends, perceived as putting further pressure on Husserl to clarify the issue. If I understand Crowell's point correctly,
Heidegger seems to want to convey to Husserl that precisely through the reduction to a worldconstituting66subjectivity Husserl has unknowingly envisioned what is, to Heidegger, the big discovery, namely that the manner of being of the human subject is radically different from any other inner worldly being. Heidegger's point would be, then, not to reject the paradox but to bring it to full fruition. Husserl, as so often, had the ground-breaking insight, but was not able to embrace it fully. From this perspective, Heidegger's framing of the human subject as Dasein is but a consistent development from Husserl's own insight. Transcendental phenomenology thus moves from an epistemology of subjectivity (fixated on "theoretical intentionality," 202) to an ontology of Dasein as a fundamental discipline that thematizes Dasein in the uniqueness of its being, as opposed to vorhanden and zuhanden entities in the world. Vorhanden and zuhanden are modes of being of those things that Dasein discovers and deals with -in Husserl's terminology, constitutes. Again, whether this reading will satisfy members of either camp remains to be seen. The question comes down to that of whether either parties will accept the
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move "from epistemology to ontology." Husserlians might object (as Husserl himself has complained bitterly 25 ) that it would be a misunderstanding to think that Husserl merely analyzed theoretical, intellective acts and not willing, valuing etc. acts as well. In this light, epistemology is, to be sure, about "knowing" the world, yet in a broad manner. In this light, the question" epistemology or ontology?" would be a mere quarrel over words. Followers of Heidegger, on the other hand, might object that the shift to ontology is about more than just labeling Heidegger's own attempt in opposition to traditional terminology. It is, rather, about a whole new style of thinking that does away with the entire problematic ontology of Western philosophy. Even bringing him into the proximity of Husserl would be selling Heidegger's true intentions short.
There are certainly passages in Heidegger's oeuvre that would support this reading as well.
This issue cannot be decided here, and it surely will remain a quarrel over which both parties will fight as long as they will remain "camps." However, Crowell points to fruitful paths as to how one can exploit the best in both thinkers to move to a richer phenomenological account of the space of meaning. Whether members of either camp will be willing to join the arena, and hence to tone down some radicalities on either side, will be up to them. At the very least, the passages where Crowell discusses the relationship between Husserl and Heidegger show why this debate is such an exciting issue not only for phenomenologists, but for philosophers in general who want to reconstruct the development of Western philosophy in the twentieth century.
The Problem of (Dis)Continuity Between Life,Science and Philosophy
Next I will address one systematic issue that concerns especially the self definition of phenomenology, esp. in its dispute with the Neo-Kantians over67the very role of philosophy.
Crowell initially argues in favor of phenomenology but runs into a new difficulty. The issue concerns what Crowell terms the "continuity thesis" (75). It is, essentially, about the question concerning the status of philosophy in general, or its locus vis-a`-vis other "intellectual"
endeavors. Here, phenomenology takes a radically different position than the Neo-Kantians who (supposedly) adhere to the continuity thesis. What is this thesis about? It states that philosophy stands in one line with the attempts of the positive sciences and that there is an essential continuity between sciences and philosophy. This idea can be derived from one of the main tenets of Neo-Kantianism (esp. the Marburg school), namely the transcendental method of construction. The world as we know it -and this is all we can address after the transcendental turn -becomes constructed through subjective activities that in different modes constitute reality for us. This begins with primitive acts (speaking, gesturing etc.) but continues with "higher order"
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activities such as positive sciences and, furthermore, other cultural activities. In this vein, philosophy does essentially nothing different; it continues to construct reality and its specific task is to interpret the doings of the entirety of constructive humanactivities. 26 This is why, e.g.
to Cassirer, the critique of reason must turn into the critique of culture. Culture is the overarching term for all constructive activities of mankind. Since philosophy itself reflects critically upon the entirety of these constructions (in the different spaces of meaning that
Cassirer calls "symbolic forms"), it clarifies how all of these activities melt into an overarching world view (Weltanschauung). That is, philosophy itself contributes to and itself articulates this world view and is nothing divorced from it. Against this, phenomenology emphasizes philosophy's radical difference or discontinuity with all other positive disciplines. The motive for this lies in Husserl's ideal of rigorous, i.e., eidetic science in its break with the naturalattitude. 27 To Husserl, doing philosophical eidetics necessitates the break with the straight-forward life of the natural attitude. Philosophy, in this sense, is about establishing supra-temporal truths and ought not to be a "commentary" on the state of the current society or (scientific) community. For, if one were to conceive of philosophy in this way as merely factoring into a world view, one would end up in naturalism as well as historicism. Philosophy would be naturalistic because it applies worldly ("natural") categories to something that is radically different, i.e., the space of meaning, which is a transcendental concept. And moreover, philosophy would be historicistic, because it is not dealing with eidetic truths but (seemingly) reduces philosophy to articulating the contingent beliefs of a contingent cultural setting at a certain time. "The philosophical significance of the space of meaning," Crowell thus writes, "can be appreciated only by bracketing the naturalistic assumptions underpinning the idea of such a continuity" (75).A philosophy that subscribes to the "discontinuity thesis," like Crowell believes phenomenology must, holds that the space where philosophy dwells has to be radically different from all worldly activities, as it articulates what makes these very activities possible. thematization of the space of meaning, philosophy will forever be unable to contribute to it or act within it; it forever remains "beyond" (jenseits) the life-world. It can, hence, never close the gap it itself has opened. It is these issues that especially Husserl (and Fink) clearly saw and wrestled with, chiefly in the late texts concerning the self-enworlding of the transcendental subject.
First off, one can challenge Crowell's view by questioning that especially Husserl was ever content with this radical discontinuity. 28 Particularly when spelled out in the context of politics, such a conclusion must make one queasy. Husserl in some late manuscripts (after 1933!) himself questioned his own earlier assumption of an "unparticipating observer" and speaks of the phenomenologist as performing a "continuing constitution" (Fortkonstitution) of the world through her very activities as a philosopher. 29 Although this raises further unsolved problems that cannot be discussed here, one should at the very least mention that Husserl himself moved beyond this idea of a radical discontinuity, or at least questioned it throughout. I do not point this out as a lack in Crowell's presentation of Husserl but rather as a genuine problem that Husserl saw and that drove him to continually rethink this "discontinuity thesis" that is implied in the radical break through the reduction. Thus, while Husserl never ceased to emphasize the radical difference of the performance of phenomenology, he was not, and could not be, happy with the possible consequences of this discontinuity. and that it only has to make explicit. Crowell quotes Heidegger (GA 61, p. 88) as saying that philosophical categories are "nothing invented, no 'framework' or independent society of logical schemata. They have their own mode of access which, however, is not such as would be foreign to life itself, imposed upon it arbitrarily from without, but is just the eminent way in which life comes to itself." Crowell concludes in a Novalis-esque gesture: "Philosophy is not a theory responsible for a certain alienation with the life-world, whereas philosophy must pay heed to this life-world precisely in its pre-theoretical status? Phenomenology, in reminding of us of the lifeworldly basis of any human activity, thus counteracts the idealizing tendency of the positive sciences. But Husserl has a slightly more complicated story. He would never say that the sciences themselves are discontinuous with natural life on the one hand and philosophy on the other. The sciences merely articulate the pre-theoretical curiosity and prescientific tendencies of natural life, like the practical activities of the land-measurer (the geometer), only to elevate them to a level of methodological rigor (e.g., abstract geometry). And in this sense, there is (ideallynot in times of crises) a further continuity between science and philosophy as well, as philosophy is but a higher-order reflection, regardless of the fact that doing philosophy, and eventually phenomenology, requires a methodological radicality that ultimately questions all prejudices of the natural attitude. Philosophical inquiry must have its seeds in the natural attitude; otherwise there would be no possibility to overcome the natural attitude. In this sense, Husserl shows us a way to integrate life, science and philosophy, whereas Heidegger does not really tell us a story of how the sciences fit into the picture while, in general, also adhering to the continuity thesis with respect to life and philosophy. 31 Perhaps this is too general a way to rephrase Crowell's point, but when spelled out it essentially comes down to this assessment.
Thus it seems that both Husserl and Heidegger are more prone to be on the side of the "continuity thesis" than Crowell wants to allow for when he stresses the difference between phenomenology and the Neo-Kantians. To be sure, both Husserl and Heidegger vigorously attack the idea of philosophy as contributing to world views (and the concomitant naturalism and
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historicism).But could it not be, rather, that the whole impulse of both Heidegger's hermeneutics of facticity and Husserl's analyses of the life-world is about restoring a healthy continuity between life and philosophy, life and thought; to reconcile this very problem of the danger of discontinuity by giving continuity a new meaning? This would seem to me a more just presentation of their specifically phenomenological attempts, and I do not think that Crowell would disagree with this assessment. His own argument for the discontinuity thesis, however, seems to run counter to his own intentions in reading Husserl and Heidegger as articulating the space of meaning, a space of which the sciences, too, are a part. To be sure, the situation of philosophy, especially today, is such that it is endangered by all kinds of disciplines impinging on its original domains, such as sociology, anthropology, linguistics, etc. Insisting on the "special status" of philosophy has, for good reasons, been a major concern for philosophers (especially, but not exclusively) in the transcendental tradition. However, one part of the self-assertion of philosophy, it seems to me, depends upon telling a convincing story about how philosophy itself comes into being in and through the pre-theoretical life-world, something which both Husserl and Heidegger obviously do an exceptionally good job at explaining. However, if this is done at the risk of losing what makes philosophy special, one does end up with a problem. In the end, it seems one is left with the option of allowing for this to happen (of actually considering it a problem), and hence giving up some of the "aloofness" of philosophy (something that would be of less concern for some more "grounded" philosophers), or of fighting to retain this distance.
Gnostic Phenomenology (Fink vs. Husserl)
In conclusion, I want to mention the interesting last article in this collection, which deals with Fink's attempt at drafting a transcendental theory of method in the Husserlian framework (of the Meditations). This important text (the Sixth Cartesian Meditation) still has not received the attention it deserves, i.e., in reassessing the scope and limits of transcendental phenomenology. Many phenomenologists still either ignore it or dismiss it all too light-handedly.
While Crowell in the end rejects Fink's attempts as well (not surprisingly given his overall reading of transcendental phenomenology), he nevertheless sees the "Sixth" as a serious challenge that needs to be addressed by anyone subscribing to transcendental phenomenology.
Crowell articulates his uneasiness (reading the "Sixth" had "a chilling effect," 244) and takes a critical stance. As is known, the Sixth Meditation experienced its first reception in France Crowell, "Gnostic."
Crowell traces this Gnosticism in several aspects of Fink's draft. Presumably under the influence of Heidegger, Fink presses Husserl on the issue of the status of being or rather "prebeing" of the transcendental field. Since it cannot "be" in the sense of the "positive," it must beas this seems the only alternative -a non-being (me-on). Crowell keenly picks up on the problem that follows from this move. If the transcendental cannot "be," how is it supposed to be experienced? Is this not a frontal attack on phenomenology's ideal of intuition? Crowell writes:
"Are not all reflective acts, as acts, bound up in the stream of constituting subjectivity -and thus to the extent that the onlooker 'looks' on, is this not also a reflective act in which objectivities of some sort are constituted?" (253) This points back to the problem discussed in the previous section: It is precisely this Finkian consequence of phenomenology as "meontology" that makes
Husserl question the discontinuity thesis. The unparticipating onlooker, though having broken with the natural attitude, continues to constitute through her "phenomenologizing" acts. The transcendental is not a new (me-)ontological sphere; rather, it is nothing but the world as it is viewed from the philosophical attitude. It is a reflective move anyone can take when reflecting on the space of meaning itself. Were this not the case, then these discoveries could not be communicated between human beings. In Fink's story, the onlooker is a certain privileged "spin off" of transcendental subjectivity (prior to its individuation), who forms a "hermetic doctrine" thinks that Fink's attempt is nothing to be dismissed easily; it seems a tempting path, but is, in truth, a slippery slope.
33
These are just the most prominent issues in an otherwise remarkable and inspiring book.
Hopefully the points made in this review are more than "mere quibbles," but instead raise questions and concerns in an ongoing discussion in phenomenology. 
